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Abstract / Résumé
Using a new data source on early Canadian strikes, this paper
seeks to explain the determinants of strike durations, 1901-14. Three
different approaches are evaluated: a screening model, a strike-waves
model, and a war-of-attrition model. The results are sensitive to strike
issue. For non-wage issue strikes, the screening model performs poorly.
A strike-waves model that incorporates elements of a war-of-attrition is
best suited to explain the durations of multiple-issue strikes. The
determinants of durations for the period are compared with findings for
the period after 1945.
Avec laide dune nouvelle source de données sur les grèves
canadiennes, cet article cherche à expliquer les facteurs déterminants dans
la durée des grèves pour la période allant de 1901 à 1914. Trois approches
différentes sont évaluées : un modèle screening, un modèle vague-de-
grèves, et un modèle de guerre dusure. Les résultats sont directement liés
aux facteurs mis en jeu dans les grèves. Pour les grèves dont les points de
litige ne portent pas sur les revenus, le modèle screening nest pas très
adéquat. Un modèle vague-de-grève qui incorpore les éléments dun
modèle de guerre dusure offre un meilleur cadre pour analyser les durées
des grèves ayant de multiples points de litige. Les facteurs déterminants
dans la durée des grèves pour la période sont comparés aux résultats
trouvés pour la période daprès 1945.
Indeed these features provide the key test (Kennan and Wilson 1989) in selecting among models.1
For a related model, see Cousineau and Lacroix (1986).2
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I. Introduction
Gavin Wright (1987) observed that economic history forms a bridge between labour
economics and labour history. The gap between the disciplines is most evident in their
different approaches to studying the determinants of strikes and strike dimensions. The
aim of this paper is to bring together recent contributions by labour economists and
historians in an analysis of strike durations, using a new source on individual strikes
in Canada between 1901 and 1914.
Three approaches to strike durations are evaluated. The first approach is
associated with the new information economics. In explaining the stylized facts that
periods of economic expansion are associated with more but shorter strikes, this
approach posits that workers go on strike to get information about the profitability of
firms. Empirical tests of this model for Canada, Harrison and Stewart (1989) is the1
best example, have been restricted to the post 1945 period. This begs the question:2
how robust are these models? Before union consolidation environmental variability
was great and it was difficult for workers to discriminate between profitable and
unprofitable firms, leaving aside whether they could distinguish between good and bad
economic states. As collective bargaining became regularized, more information
would have been increasingly available to both parties on wage offers and demands,
and there would have been alternatives to strikes. It would be expected, therefore, that
with union consolidation strike frequencies would be reduced and they would be
limited to periods of cyclical change when environmental variability was greatest. At
issue, then, is when these changes occurred.
The second approach to strike durations is associated with the strike wave
hypothesis. Labour historians have emphasised mobilization factors in explaining the
frequency and duration of strikes before 1914. The literature for the most part sees
strikes in the period before 1914 as a struggle for union representation, better working
conditions, and control of the labour process. Strikes often took place in waves which
were not necessarily related to the business cycle, as the new information economics
maintains.
The third approach is associated with a war-of-attrition model which in fact
combines many of the attributes of asymmetric information models and those found
in the labour history literature. Whereas screening or signalling models are appropriate
where gains are divisible, a war-of-attrition model is appropriate in win or lose
situations. The war continues until one side quits. The decision to quit depends in turn
on fixed costs. In a situation where there are multiple issues in dispute, fixed costs are
high. Loosing on wages might mean loosing on working hours or union recognition.
This is important for our purposes because our data set, like others for the early period, does not include3
observations on wage settlements.
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In this type of model both parties have private information, and strike waves would
have made it difficult for both parties to get information about each other, thereby
lengthening durations, independent of the economic environment.
Because of data limitations we try the asymmetric information and strike
wave models directly, and the war-of-attrition model in absentia. We find that labour
history and labour economics are indeed complementary. While the economics
literature needs to incorporate the historical context in evaluating models, the historian
needs theory to assess the relative importance of mobilization and cyclical strikes.
The next section presents a review of the history and economics literature.
The data source is described in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the hazard model and
Section 5 gives the results. A concluding section discusses the application of strike
models in their historical context.
II. Literature Review
The basic feature of the new information models in explaining strike behaviour is its
rejection of the notion that strikes are irrational. Why do workers and firms fail to
settle disputes since a strike implies that the pie is getting smaller? The leading
candidate in explaining this apparent inefficiency is the screening model. Poorly
informed unions with monopoly power use strikes to discriminate among firms of
different profitability by exploiting the impatience of high-profit firms to settle quickly
for high wages. Strike incidence should be procyclical because it would be associated
with greater uncertainty about firms profits (e.g. an inflationary period). Wage
settlements would fall as duration increased. The empirical evidence in support of this
class of models is mixed. McConnell (1989) found that in the U.S. wages fell with
time to settlement, but Card (1990) analyzing Canadian contract data found no direct
relationship.
A further problem with the screening model is that it has difficulty in
explaining the countercyclical duration of strikes. In Hayes (1984) model potential3
strikes will last longer if the situation anticipated by the union does not materialize;
conversely if there is an increased probability that the firms ability to pay will be low,
the unions initial wage demands will be reduced, and potential strikes will be shorter.
However, there is a well established body of evidence (Kennan 1986) showing that
settlement rates are procyclical. Harrison and Stewart (1989) using a data set for
Canada for 1946-1983, reported mean durations of 31 days for high-production
months, and 41 days for low production months; similar results are reported by
Gunderson and Melino (1990).
What exactly constituted a union in the early period is often difficult to judge. Many of the unions were4
clearly not permanent. Indeedmany of the strikes analyzed in this paper were held without a union present.
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In reconciling the evidence and the screening model, Kennan and Wilson
(1989) showed that the model is sensitive to bargaining procedures, such as whether
the union, the firms, or both make wage offers, and the frequency of offers. It is in the
unions interest to delay the time interval between offers. If it can show that it can
delay offers, it will encourage the firm to accept an initial high offer. The unions
problem is essentially one of building and maintaining a reputation that its offers will
be infrequent. Unions might find it difficult to commit to infrequent higher offers in
boom times  and durations are countercyclical  because its membership might
have alternative opportunities. During trade slowdowns unions might have better
control over their membership.
Because of the sensitivity of the basic screening model to its assumptions
about bargaining procedures and environment, one possibility to evaluating its
explanatory power is to examine an earlier period when unions had obviously less
control over membership. Card and Olson (1992) have turned their attention to the4
late nineteenth century, but there are no comparable studies for Canada. When did the
countercyclical pattern of durations begin? Are strike durations unrelated to the
bargaining environment?
For more than a decade, a new generation of Canadian labour historians has
been exploring many of these issues. Much of this work has been published in
Labour/Le Travail, and summaries of this literature are found in Palmer (1992) and
Morton (1988). Although there is some agonizing over finding trends or explaining
Canadian exceptionalism, this new research situates strikes in their historical
context: their location, sector, and political, legal and social background. Kealey
(1989, p. 228) wrote: Each national working class experience must be studied
historically and understood in light of contrasting experience, not held up against a
reified model, which never existed. This literature has eschewed quantitative methods
and questions. An exception is the work of Kealey himself (1989, Cruikshank and
Kealey 1987) who, in a project for the Canadian Historical Atlas has revised Canadian
strike data and, using the familiar framework of Shorter and Tilly (1974), has
produced statistics on strike dimensions from 1891 to 1961.
Several aspects of the Canadian experience appear to have affected the
duration of strikes, although at times there appears to be little if no consensus about
the direction of the effect. It is has been argued that strike durations were longer in the
Maritimes where there were bitter disputes in the mining sector and those involving
unskilled labour (McKay 1988), but resource industries in other parts of the country
exhibited many of the same features as well (Mouat 1990). For the entire country the
relative proportion of male workers involved in a strike is thought to have increased
durations. Yet women workers were not immune from militancy (Ferland 1989).
For a history of the IDIA and industries affected see Craven (1980) and Russell (1990).5
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There is also lack of agreement about the effect of the legal environment. It has been
suggested that the introduction of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act in 1907
reduced the propensity to strike and that it also shortened the length of disputes
because of the exchange of offers before the strike was called. The act assured that5
[b]etter information could be provided to both parties by having the government
collect and publish various types of statistics. With such support, disputes would not
result from misunderstanding of the true situation facing the parties (Cruikshank
1993). The 1907 Act was limited to the mining, utilities and transportation sector 
not surprising given the importance of exports in the economy  but other sectors
were affected indirectly by the change in legal environment, if only because they feared
intervention as well. However, Huxley (1979) offers the countervailing view that any
strike that occurred after mediation would have been a long strike anyway.
A distinguishing feature of this period was the growth of international
unionism. It may be speculated that international unions grew because of their ability
to withstand longer strikes (Maki 1986). Even in Quebec where national unions were
entrenched, les périodes de dépression étaient funestes pour les syndicats fragiles
comme létaient les syndicats nationaux (Rouillard 1979, p. 134). But others have
argued that internationals were less militant with their interest focussed more on single
 and narrow  wage issues (Babcock 1975; Zerker 1982).
There appears to more of a consensus about the role of strike waves. In his
own description of the data until 1930, Kealey observed the cyclical character of
strikes before 1930, but he emphasized the strike waves of 1899-1903, 1912-1913,
and 1917-20, and the political, regional and sectoral features of these mobilizations.
These strike waves were international (Haimson and Tilly 1989). In all countries
workers in metal processing and mechanical enterprises were particularly affected by
changes in organization and technology, and they were among the most militant
participants in strike waves. As for timing, Boll (1989) in his study of Germany found
that while strike waves may have begun in good economic states with short durations,
they persisted. Haimson (1989, p. 525) summarizing the state of research observed:
What distinguished these strike waves of labor unrest was the
degree to which, at least among the strata of workers who were
most militantly involved in them, all forms of labor unrest 
including ostensibly economic strikes  came to focus explicitly
over issues of power and authority. Even more notable was the
acuteness of the sense that these strata of workers came to display
the inextricable link between their position in the workplace  and
particularly the issue of control over the character and pace of their
own work  and their position in the polity as a whole.
This fits aptly Plamers (1992, p. 172) description of strikes in the Maritimes: Employers imported strike6
breakers by the thousands [and] stood fast against unionism...They had won the battle, but they would lose
a war...
For a history of the Department of Labour see Craven (1980).7
6
These strike waves can be incorporated in a war of attrition model. Unlike
the screening model, the war of attrition model assumes that both parties have private
information about the delay costs of settling disputes. Each party continues in a dispute
as long as its privately known cost of continuation is less than the expected gain (the
value of the prize times the probability the other party will soon capitulate). As the
dispute continues, each partys assessment of the probability that the other will
capitulate declines; eventually one of them acquiesces to stop the rising costs of delay,
thus leading to a winner-take-all settlement. In situations where firms and workers are
disputing multiple issues, the costs of quitting are high, if losing the battle about wages
implies losing union recognition. This class of models thus predicts declining
settlement rates (the quit rate also declines with time, since players with lower delay
costs have later stopping times); but they provide no clue to cyclical frequencies
because the model implies that incidence depends on the extent of uncertainties about
delay costs.
Strike waves such as those occurring in the early twentieth century exhibited
some of these features. Strikes in these periods were generally about multiple issues
and they made for uncertainties about the parties evaluations of their own costs of
delay, and each others. From the perspective of firms, it was uncertain whether losing
the battle of attrition meant losing the war against union consolidation, and whether
union recognition would lower their long-term profitability. For workers, it was6
unknown whether a firms recognition of their demands during boom periods would
be repeated, and whether firms would always deal with their union. Strike waves
clearly made for unstable bargaining relationships (Mauro 1982). As a result of these
uncertainties, how the war of attrition was resolved and its effect on duration can best
be understood in terms of the historical context.
III. Data
The data used in this paper to evaluate screening and war of attrition models are from
the Strikes and Lockouts File of the Department of Labour in Canada. In response to
the growing number of work stoppages in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the Department began collecting detailed information on strikes: length of
dispute, size of workforce involved, cause of dispute, how the strike was settled, in
whose favor, and so on.7
Card and Olson (1992) have more confidence in strike outcomes for the U.S.8
Three sample sizes are used in the estimations to take into acount different information about whether9
unions were involved (N = 698) and whether the union was an international or Canadian (N = 551). The
large sample (N =1129) gives no information on union involvement. See the next section for further
discussion.
Card and Olson (1992) in their study for the U.S. in the 1880s found a comparable mean (median) of 2010
(9) days; they also reported that 47 percent of strikes were about wages. For a discussion of the significance
of wage issue strikes in the early period, see Montgomery (1987, p. 91).
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The reports did not include some important information, notably on the actual
wage settled upon at the end of the dispute. A further drawback is that strike results
were ambiguous. A strike outcome was often recorded as a success, failure or
compromise; but many results, especially for short strikes of less than five days, were
left as undetermined or indefinite. The presence of compromise and undetermined
results poses a serious problem for estimating a pure war-of-attrition model in a
competing risk framework, and we are thus forced to adopt a single-risk approach in
the following section.8
From the files we have been able to assemble a data set of 1182 strikes.
Appendix 1 gives definitions of variables and industries covered. This does not
represent the entire population of Canadian strikes in the period, but the time series
of the strikes from the files corresponds with the aggregate time series reported by the
Department of Labour (Urquhart and Buckley 1983). As for the geographic and
sectoral distribution of strikes, it is probably the case that the reports to the
Department may underestimate strikes in Quebec and in eastern and western regions,
but it is unclear how serious this bias affects the analysis that follows.
The basic descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Tables 1-3.
Table 1 reports the means for all variables. For indicator variables, the mean9
represents the relevant percentage. Thus 3.1% of strikes were violent; and the number
of strikes resulting in a compromise was about forty percent. Table 2 examines strikes
by issue. The mean (median) duration of strikes in the early period (22.7 (7)) was less
than that for the period after 1945 (35.51 (20)) reported by Harrison and Stewart .10
Single issue strikes over wages comprised about 45 percent of all strikes; single issue
strikes over unionisation, less than 10 percent; and multiple issue strikes involving
unionisation, 20 percent. Consider as well that for the medium and smaller samples,
for which information about union presence is available, the percentage of single wage
issue strikes is only 8 percent, but for the large sample it is about 45 percent. The high
proportion of multiple issue strikes that included wage disputes stands in contrast to
the post 1945 period when less than 50 percent of strikes were about wages. It may
be speculated, therefore, that the early period sample underestimates union and work
related strikes. Although strikes were reported to be ostensibly about wages, they may
have represented additional issues to the parties involved.
h(t) '
j
t%r
i't&r
n(i)
j
t%r
i't&r
N(i)
,
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Duration varied by issue as has been found in studies of the post WWII
period. Multiple issue strikes and strikes involving unionisation lasted longer than
wage issue strikes, as would be expected in a war-of-attrition model. Note that
Harrison and Stewart found the opposite for the early period, and it might be
speculated that after 1945 gains were more easily divisible between the parties. There
was also variation by industry as summarized in Table 2. Metal workers strikes were
only a little longer than the average, but strikes of machine workers lasted more than
five times as long as transport workers, three times as long as unskilled workers, and
twice as long as building trade workers. Strikes by region did not vary much, and this
again is in contrast to Harrison and Stewart who found that strikes outside Central
Canada (Quebec and Ontario) lasted slightly longer. Table 4 examines the survival
rate of all strikes by year. The number of strikes shows roughly a cyclical pattern,
peaking in 1903, 1907, and 1912-1913. These coincide approximately with the peak
years (Dec. 1902, Dec. 1906, Nov. 1912) identified by White (1970) in his
comprehensive study of business cycles in Canada. This would offer some support to
the screening model of strike behaviour. Table 4 also shows survival rates or the
proportion of strikes beginning in that year that lasted at least as long as the stated
number of days. The number of strikes lasting at least as long as 25 days does
correspond to movements in the cycle, rising in 1903 and 1912 and 1913. Durations
in 1909 appear to pose a problem to models that predict procyclical durations.
To capture the heterogeneity of strikes we estimate the hazards, that is the
sample estimates of the sequence of conditional settlement probabilities by strike
issue. We follow Kennan (1985) and Harrison and Stewart and estimate this as
where n(t) is the number of strikes with duration of exactly t days, and N(t) is the
number of strikes with the duration of at least t days. Smoothing is required because
of the small number of strikes settled on any one day as t gets large; following others
we set r, for each t, to keep the denominator sufficiently large that the standard error
of the estimate never exceeds 0.03 percent. As shown in Figure 1, settlement
probabilities are higher for wage (12 percent) than union (9 percent) issue strikes, and
Many strikes end at multiples of seven days and this may be due to reporting conventions. As a result there11
may be some errors in the reporting of actual strike lengths that is difficult to correct for. The fact that many
strikes lasted a multiple of seven days should have no effect on the estimated hazard functions reported in
the following section.
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that the latter declines at a greater rate before flattening out. A wage strike lasting11
between 10 and 20 days was settled twice as quickly as a union issue strike. Note that
Harrison and Stewart found the wage issue strikes had a lower initial settlement rate
(3 percent compared to 11 percent for non-wage strikes) and then declined steadily.
Returning to the earlier period, the rate of settlement gives some support to the war of
attrition model.
In sum, the basic descriptive statistics highlight the significance of multiple
issue strikes, but screening models are most appropriate where the gains are divisible.
The following sections investigate whether the nature of strike issue also affected
duration.
IV. The Underlying Model
Hazard models provide the standard means for evaluating the determinants of strike
duration. The basic approach has been described in detail elsewhere (Kiefer 1988).
Here we focus on features relevant to our needs.
The hazard or settlement rate is defined as
(1) h(t) = lim (Prob(t # T # ) + t)/)),
)-0
where T represents the duration of the strike. The numerator in the limit is simply the
conditional probability that the strike will end in the next interval, from t to t + ),
given that it has already lasted t days. The settlement rate is roughly...the rate at
which spells are completed after duration t, given that they last at least until t (Greene
1993). This hazard rate can be expressed in several ways including
(2) = lim((F(t + )) - F(t))/ )S(t));
)-0
(3) = f(t)/ S(t),
where F(t) = prob(T # t) is the cumulative probability - the unconditional probability
that the strike duration is less than or equal to t; where the survival function is S(t) =
1 - F(t) or the unconditional probability that duration is greater or equal to t; and where
f(t) is the pdf, or the probability density function for duration.
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Note that since h(t)S(t) = f(t), hazard function estimation can be viewed as
maximum likelihood estimation parameterized in terms of a hazard function and a
survival function. The log-likelihood function is
(4) 3logh(t) + 3logS(t) = 3logf(t).
There are several possible functional forms for the hazard function.
Specification tests (Jaggia 1991) on a variety of functional forms (exponential, log-
normal, log-logistic) led to the use of the log-logistic form. Thus,
(5) h(t) =Jp(Jt) /{1 + (Jt) };p-1 p-1
(6) S(t) = 1/{1 + (Jt) }.p-1
In this setup, p is a parameter of the hazard function. With a log-logistic form, the
hazard function declines monotonically for p < 1. If p > 1, the hazard function initially
rises, reaches a maximum and then declines monotonically thereafter. The effect of
firm and worker characteristics, policy initiatives, macroeconomics indicators and
other relevant variables on duration enter through J by definingJ as exp(-$X). In
this model the expected value of the log duration is:
(7) E(lnt) = -lnJ = $X.
Thus the coefficients on the independent variables in the hazard model are
the partial derivatives of the expected value of log duration with respect to the
corresponding independent variable. Some other useful relationships for interpreting
log-logisitc hazard function results are:
(8) median duration = 1/J;
(9) Mmedian/MX = $ x (a positive term);j j
(10) Mh(t)/ dXj = $ x (a negative term).j
Note that if duration is negatively related to the independent variable, the settlement
rate is positively related to that variable. That is, if the expected duration is shorter, the
probability of settlement at any given time is higher.
V. Results
Table 5 presents results from hazard estimation and OLS with log duration as the
dependent variable. Information on whether a union was involved and whether it was
a national (Canadian) or international organization was sketchy and as a result, three
In other regressions (not reported) the correlation between the strike wave variable and changes in GNP12
was weak.
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samples sizes were used. Estimation based on the small sample allowed us to
distinguish between union types; the medium sample included a union variable only;
the large size sample omits the union variable. (The OLS results reported are
restricted to the medium sized sample.) For each hazard estimate, the last row reports
the change in the predicted duration due to (1) the change of the respective dummy
variable from 0 to 1; or (2) the change of the non-dummy variable from its mean value
to mean +1. For the large sized sample for example, the addition of one hundred extra
workers to a strike, adds about two days to a strike. In all models the real GNP
variable [Altman (1993) correction of Green and Urquhart (1994)] is measured as
deviations from trend.
When hazard function estimation is used to study the determinants of strike
duration, the overall specification of the model can be tested through an examination
of the distribution of the generalized residuals, where a generalized residual is defined
as the negative of the log of the estimated survival rate (Table 6). A conditional
moment test based on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th central moments of the generalized
residuals (Jaggia 1991) does not reveal any specification problems for the model
based on the small sample which contains full information on all of our variables.
When we move to the medium sample where the international union dummy is
omitted, there is only slight evidence of misspecification, as the test indicates no
misspecification only at 1 and 2.5% levels of significance. As we move to the large
sample where all variables regarding union involvement are omitted, there are
stronger signs of misspecification. It should also be noted, that although other
functional forms (Weibull, log-normal, and exponential) yielded similar qualitative
results for the hazard model, the log logistic model performed best in terms of the
conditional moment tests for misspecification.
Returning to Table 5, our more important findings are:
 Bigger (i.e. more strikers) strikes and strikes involving more than one firm lasted
longer. Although Kennan (1985) found that in the U.S. settlements for large strikes
after WWII had a distinct U-shaped pattern  settlement rates were initially lower for
larger strikes, there then followed a period in which settlement rates increase with
duration, followed by a decline in settlement rates after 90 days  Gunderson and
Melino (1990) found that for Canada between 1967 and 1985 the number of workers
had an insignificant effect on strike durations. More recently, Harrison and Stewart
(1993) found that the effect of strike size on duration depends on issue and industry,
and that the effect is usually, but not always linear.
 The number of strikes (whether lagged or current)  an indicator of a strike wave
 was positive and significant when the large and medium sized samples were used.12
Violence, which was a feature of strike waves, also led to longer strikes. In other
The industry effects also incorporate a seasonal component. The construction industry, for example, would13
only experience strikes in non-winter months.
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regressions (not reported) union membership was also included as a regressor, but
because of multicollinearity with the GNP variable it was dropped.
 Disputes including women were not different from those involving men only, raising
issue with Palmers (1992, p. 193) description that [r]adicalism took on the trappings
of a masculine project.
 The regression results show there was no difference in duration whether the strike
was led by an International or Canadian union. Why international unions were
successful thus remains an open question.
 Although the labour history literature has made much of the regional diversity of
strike behaviour, durations were not significantly different across the country. The
regional nature of strikes is closely associated with seasonal factors. It was difficult13
to test for the latter directly because many of the reports on shorter strikes (less than
five days) simply recorded days lost, and not the actual dates of strike.
 In other regressions (not reported) city effects were included as a regressor. Neither
the population of cities nor the change in population between the census dates of 1901
and 1911 affected duration.
 As in other countries strikes in Canada among skilled and machine workers who
were faced by changes in managerial techniques and work organization lasted longer
than other disputes. These findings are consistent with Palmers claims (p. 173) that
textile and garment workers who waged similar struggles against the modernization
of the labour process were unsuccessful.
 The regression results for the large sample indicate that the IDIA act which intended
to reduce information costs and regularize bargaining did indeed have the result of
shortening disputes. The results are less than robust, however; still in all cases the sign
on the dummy for 1907 is negative which runs counter to the hypothesis (Huxley
1979) that legislation had the perverse result of lengthening disputes that did occur.
 The output variables indicate that the response of durations to output depended on
the strike issue. Wage and work issue strikes were countercyclical. The relevant
coefficients are the sum of the GNP and interaction variables which are reported in
Table 7. For all hazard models, the absolute value of the t-statistics for wage issue
strikes are greater than two; there is weaker evidence regarding the countercyclicality
of work, union, and multiple issue strikes. Other ways of measuring output changes
were tried, including an indicator for good and bad years, but the results were not
changed greatly.
For a review of this literature see Lacroix (1986).14
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V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The period 1901-14 were years of transition in Canadian industrial relations, and in
comparison with the period after 1945 there was a higher proportion of multiple issue
strikes and settlement rates declined over time. In this context the screening model
does not perform well. Durations were affected by the nature of the dispute as one
would expect in a war-of-attrition model. Workers would hold out as long as possible
to initiate unionization or preserve gains in working conditions earned in previous
disputes. These disputes were often present in strike waves that did not necessarily
correspond to the business cycle before 1914. This result confirms similar findings on
the growth of union membership and the business cycle.14
The countercyclical duration of wage issue strikes suggests that screening
models, like the variant proposed by Kennan and Wilson, might be appropriate in
periods where unions are well established, and when multiple issue strikes declined.
As unions consolidated they began to serve the important function of acquiring
information for their members about the profitability of firms, and it was only then the
duration of union led disputes about wages were both longer and countercyclical. Put
differently, only when the gains were divisible as in wage issue strikes, is the screening
model appropriate. In light of our introductory observations, models of strikes need
to be considered in their historical setting.
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Appendix 1
Variable Definitions:
1. Strikers: Number of strikers.
2. Female Strikers: Dummy variable equal to one if some or all of the strikers were female.
3. Firms: Dummy variable equal to one if more than one firm is involved in the strike.
4. Strike Issues:
Multiple: Dummy variable equal to one for strikes involving  two or more issues.
Wage: Dummy variable equal to one for single issue strikes over wages.
Union: Dummy variable equal to one for single issue strikes over unionisation.
Working Conditions: Dummy variable equal to one for single issue strikes over working
conditions.
5. Union Involvement: Dummy variable equal to one if a union was involved in the strike.
6. International Union: Dummy variable equal to one if an international union was involved in the
strike.
7. Legislation (1907) : Dummy variable equal to one in the years after the introduction of the
Industrial Disputes Act;
8. Year: Annual time trend.
9. Skill : Dummy variable equal to one if the strikers were skilled workers. Violence: Dummy
variable equal to one if there were violent episodes during the strike.
10. Location: 
West: Dummy variable equal to one if the strike took place in Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Alberta, or British Columbia.
East: Dummy variable equal to one if the strike took place in Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland, or Prince Edward Island;
11. Industry Effects: Dummy variables equal to one if the strikers worked in the particular industry
grouping defined as:
Apparel and Textiles: All textile garment workers (fur, cotton and woolens), hatters,
tailors, and jewelry workers.
Building Trades: Bricklayers, carpenters, engineers, marble workers, and plumbers.
Unskilled. Unskilled building labourers and general labourers.
Food and Tobacco: Includes brewery workers.
Machine: Boilermakers, machinists, and stove molders.
Metals: Blacksmiths, iron moulders, metal and iron workers, and wire drawers.
Mining: Includes oil drillers.
Shoes and Other Skilled: Includes leather workers and coopers.
Transportation and Utilities:  Includes street labourers, all types of railway workers.
Wood Products: Includes paper workers.
Service and Public Sector: Includes barbers, civic labor, telephone workers and
musicians.
Miscellaneous Manufacturing: Includes auto workers, glass and piano makers, and
printers.
Other: Includes fishermen, agriculture workers, and other workers who could not be
grouped as construction labourers.
12. Output Effects:
GNP: Deviations of GNP from trend levels in the year of the strike.
13. Strike Wave: Total number of strikes in the year of the strike.
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TABLE 1
MEANS OF KEY VARIABLES
Variables N=1129 N=698 N=551
Strikers 204.70 255.62 212.93
Female strikers 0.0717 0.0860 0.4156
Firms 0.3773 0.4083 0.3303
Strike issues:
Multiple 0.2640 0.3338 0.4301
Wage 0.4482 0.3725 0.0835
Union 0.0983 0.1562 0.0544
Work conditions 0.0540 0.0473 0.0980
Other 0.1355 0.0902 0.3339
Strike result:
Success 0.2861 0.2637 0.2424
Compromise 0.4005 0.4044 0.4197
Failure 0.3124 0.3319 0.3384
Union involvement 0.7951 0.7405
International union 0.6116
Canadian union 0.3884
Skill 0.6315 0.6289 0.5808
Violence 0.0310 0.0487 0.0563
Location:
West 0.2117 0.2507 0.2378
Center 0.6838 0.6719 0.6733
East 0.1045 0.0774 0.0889
Industry:
Apparel 0.1098 0.1203 0.1071
19
Building 0.0655 0.0831 0.0835
Unskilled 0.2719 0.2894 0.3013
Food & Tobacco 0.0407 0.0430 0.0345
Machine 0.0204 0.0143 0.0163
Metals 0.0921 0.0860 0.0944
Minning 0.0841 0.0802 0.0944
Shoes 0.0372 0.0372 0.0327
Transport 0.1320 0.1189 0.1180
Wood 0.0434 0.0258 0.0254
Service 0.0337 0.0358 0.0381
Mfg (misc) 0.0469 0.0401 0.0399
GNP 2.4450 2.8227 3.1142
Strike wave 18.410 24.061 28.437
Note: The variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF STRIKERS, AND MEAN AND MEDIAN DURATION BY ISSUE
Duration
Issue Strikers Mean Median
All 1182 22.71 7
Single issue 872 20.20 7
Multiple issue 305 30.07 12
Wage
(single and multiple)
803 23.58 8
Wage (single issue) 532 21.33 6
Non-wage 374 20.99 7
Union (single issue) 118 21.14 9
Work (single issue) 66 26.52 9
Misc. (single issue) 156 12.70 5
Union
(single and multiple)
234 32.59 12
Non-union 943 20.32 7
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TABLE 3
MEAN AND MEDIAN DURATION AND NUMBER OF STRIKES BY INDUSTRY LOCATION AND ISSUE
Wages Wages Non Union Union Non Single Mult.
Only Plus Wage Only Plus Union Issue Issues
All
Apparel & textile 11.67 50.24 21.21 25.87 52.25 14.97 15.62 45.00 21.86
6 20 7 9 21 7 7 20 9
55 21 56 15 20 97 104 28 132
Building trades 24.62 21.09 31.72 13.83 70.50 20.61 20.75 35.25 25.18
11 12 3 2 9 10 9 11 10
37 21 18 6 8 62 52 24 77
Unskilled 13.29 18.15 13.95 13.54 20.18 14.26 12.95 19.15 14.87
7 10 5 6 12 7 5 10 7
143 95 77 33 39 243 215 100 316
Food & tobacco 28.33 72.85 17.74 28.40 148.00 24.70 21.49 69.29 35.18
10 15 11 16 50 9 10 15 11
13 13 23 5 4 40 35 14 50
Machine 93.09 34.71 17.83 24.50 60.23 66.53 34.71 57.25
9 12 7 19 8 9 12 9
11 7 6 2 22 17 7 24
Metals 23.24 25.54 28.62 16.38 60.33 23.98 23.27 31.64 25.42
10 9 7 8 25 9 10 9 10
51 24 34 9 6 95 81 28 109
Mining 16.76 44.61 32.67 44.13 63.38 23.04 25.88 41.61 29.54
6 17 9 28 22 8 7 17 10
33 18 48 15 8 76 76 23 99
Shoe &
misc. skilled
20.56 32.20 16.09 20.12 38.00 17.23 16.25 34.38 19.54
16 5 23 8 3 33 36 8 44
7 7 8 12 34 7 8 78
22
Transport &
utilities
8.88 11.36 14.18 15.53 14.64 9.76 10.50 11.21 10.57
4 7 3 4 10 4 4 7 4
88 31 38 15 11 131 124 33 159
Wood products 18.71 14.33 17.71 7.75 1.00 19.02 18.91 11.75 17.78
6 4 7 4 1 7 7 4 7
24 6 21 4 1 46 43 8 51
Services &
public sector
8.91 22.44 8.44 9.33 23.67 10.97 8.78 22.44 11.78
4 5 10 10 16 4 4 5 5
23 9 9 3 3 35 32 9 41
Manufacturing
misc.
121.30 29.31 24.00 46.00 38.22 74.69 84.22 29.59 67.02
7 7 19 41 11 6 7 11 7
23 16 15 3 9 42 37 17 54
Other 15.00 99.25 40.67 41.00 135.25 14.16 15.37 111.80 35.46
5 79 14 41 149 10 10 149 11
14 4 6 1 4 19 19 5 24
Eastern 20.80 24.90 27.84 44.00 47.25 21.52 23.30 25.19 23.62
7 10 4 2 23 7 6 10 7
66 20 38 7 4 113 103 21 124
Central 23.20 29.70 19.52 20.94 46.91 20.94 20.71 31.62 23.40
6 12 7 10 19 6 7 12 7
371 174 257 78 77 647 602 200 803
Western 14.86 26.22 23.13 18.38 38.92 17.99 17.19 28.67 21.01
7 10 10 11 15 9 7 11 9
91 79 82 32 37 183 166 86 256
All 21.33 11 20.99 21.47 43.90 20.32 20.20 30.07 22.7
6 28 7 9 16 7 7 12 7
532 271 374 118 116 943 872 305 1182
Note: For each issue group and industry group or region, the first figure in each column is the mean duration, the second is the median
duration in the sample, and the third is the number of strikes.
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF STRIKES, MEAN AND
MEDIAN DURATION AND SURVIVAL RATES BY YEAR
Survival Rates
Year Number Day 5 Day 25 Day 50 Day 75 Day 100
Mean Median
Duration Duration
1901 78 12.69 5 0.53 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.01
1902 96 14.79 9 0.70 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.01
1903 119 20.24 10 0.68 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.03
1904 80 18.49 10 0.70 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.04
1905 67 13.78 7 0.63 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.01
1906 82 13.60 7 0.65 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00
1907 121 14.13 7 0.64 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.02
1908 52 18.85 5 0.54 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.04
1909 54 30.18 9 0.65 0.28 0.19 0.11 0.06
1910 60 12.98 6 0.62 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.03
1911 68 17.76 6 0.59 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.04
1912 140 23.15 7 0.64 0.24 0.11 0.09 0.06
1913 122 50.41 10 0.74 0.34 0.17 0.13 0.09
1914 43 65.42 11 0.70 0.42 0.23 0.19 0.19
ALL 1182 22.71 7 0.65 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.04
Note: The survival rate for each year are the proportions of all strikes beginning in
that year that lasted at least as long as the stated number of working days.
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TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF STRIKE DURATIONS
HAZARD1
Variable (N=698) (N=551) (N=698) (N=1129)
OLS I II III2
Constant 2.2411 2.2188 2.2523 2.0864
(t-stat) (48.05) (43.72) ()49.49 (58.13)
Strikers 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(t-stat) (2.94) (2.56) (3.76) (3.65)
[)duration] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Female strikers -0.1668 -0.1663 -0.1576 -0.2287
(-0.78) (-0.70) (-0.73) (-1.30)
[-1.43] [-1.15] [-1.68]
Firms 0.5454 0.6382 0.5769 0.6925
(4.73) (5.28) (5.27) (8.14)
[6.30] [4.79] [6.21]
Strike issues:
Multiple 0.6792 0.6759 0.7483 0.5397
(3.50) (2.78) (3.74) (4.06)
[7.10] [6.73] [5.01]
Wage 0.3690 0.4661 0.4511 0.2087
(1.99) (1.97) (2.28) (1.76)
[4.47] [3.74] [1.71]
Union 0.4344 0.3319 0.4590 0.2087
(2.07) (1.18) (2.28) (1.76)
[3.52] [3.74] [1.71]
Working conditions 0.4068 0.4168 0.4485 0.3315
(1.45) (1.39) (1.68) (1.80)
[4.65] [4.30] [3.12]
Union involvment 0.6690 0.4908 0.7046
(4.55) (2.43) (4.55)
[4.05] [4.30]
International union 0.1853
(1.14)
[1.67]
Year -30.54 -29.66 -31.72 -28.92
(-2.02) (-0.80) (-2.15) (-2.57)
[-0.80] [-2.20] [-0.48]
Year x year 0.0080 0.0079 0.0083 0.0076
(2.02) (0.80) (2.16) (2.57)]
Skill 0.1598 0.2656 0.2219 0.3195
(1.35) (2.21) (1.97) (3.76)
[2.40] [1.68] [2.48]
HAZARD1
Variable (N=698) (N=551) (N=698) (N=1129)
OLS I II III2
25
Violence 0.6605 0.7916 0.7058 0.8998
(2.88) (3.60) (3.45) (4.73)
[10.62] [7.69] [11.46]
Location:
West -0.0062 -0.0285 -0.0303 0.1141
(-0.05) (-0.21) (-0.25) (1.17)
[-0.26] [-0.23] [0.95]
East 0.0896 0.1877 0.1152 0.0588
(0.48) (0.94) (0.60) (0.46)
[1.87] [0.94] [0.49]
Legislation (1907) -0.0532 -0.2627 -0.1209 -0.3692
(-0.21) (-0.83) (-0.49) (-1.99)
[-2.61] [-0.96] [-2.94]
Industry effects:
Apparel & textile -0.0214 -0.0987 -0.0305 -0.3290
(-0.06) (-0.27) (-0.09) (-1.25)
[-0.87] [-0.23] [-3.03]
Building -07885 -1.1257 -0.7763 -0.3182
(-2.28) (-3.25) (-2.53) (-1.22)
[-6.83] [-4.47] [-2.25]
Unskilled -0.7698 -0.9623 -0.7566 -0.3115
(-2.46) (-3.10) (-2.70) (-1.33)
[-7.60] [-5.13] [-2.35]
Food & tobacco 0.0617 -0.3621 0.0882 0.7056
(0.16) (-0.93) (0.26) (2.46)
[-2.83] [0.71] [8.04]
Machine 0.6964 0.3236 0.7767 0.5866
(1.39) (0.70) (1.80) (1.76)
[3.50] [8.85] [6.36]
Metals -0.0055 -0.3255 -0.0330 0.1962
(-0.02) (-0.95) (-0.11) (0.77)
[-2.63] [-0.25] [1.72]
Mining -0.0064 -0.2610 0.1011 0.2144
(-0.02) (-0.78) (0.33) (0.84)
[-2.15] [0.82] [1.90]
Shoes -0.0396 -0.0415 0.0327 0.4076
(-0.10) (-0.10) (0.09) (1.38)
[-0.37] [0.26] [4.00]
Transport -0.8917 -1.1478 -0.8709 -0.6123
(-2.72) (-3.48) (-2.94) (-2.51)
[-7.19] [-5.01] [-4.01]
HAZARD1
Variable (N=698) (N=551) (N=698) (N=1129)
OLS I II III2
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Wood -0.5950 -0.9010 -0.5194 -0.0449
(-1.39) (-1.83) (-1.14) (-0.16)
[-5.59] [-3.18] [-0.35]
Service -0.7233 -0.9540 -0.6509 -0.1771
(-1.84) (-2.50) (-1.83) (-0.59)
[-5.86] [-3.80] [-1.32]
Manufacturing misc. -0.1841 -0.5662 -0.2694 0.2335
(-0.48) (-1.44) (-0.76) (0.79)
[-4.07] [-1.85] [2.00]
Output effects:
GNP
-0.0225 -0.0221 -0.0206 -0.0153
(-0.84) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.96)
[-0.21] [-0.16] [-0.12]
UnionpresencexGNP 0.0025 0.0023 -0.0009
(0.15) (0.12) (-0.05)
[0.02] [-0.01]
UnionissuexGNP 0-0168 0.0410 0.0211 0.0226
(0-61) (1.01) (0.69) (1.01)
[0.38] [0.17] [0.18]
WorkissuexGNP -0.0276 -0.0221 -0.0348 -0.0128
(-0.79) (-0.57) (-1.00) (-0.68)
[-0.21] [-0.27] [-0.10]
WageissuexGNP -0.0295 -0.0357 -0.0347 -0.0237
(-1.24) (-1.04) (-1.23) (-1.39)
[-0.32] [-0.26] [-0.19]
MultipleissuexGNP -0.0155 -0.0124 -0.0161 -0.0128
(-0.62) (-0.35) (-0.57) (-0.68)
[-0.11] [-0.12] [-0.10]
Strike wave 0.0043 0.0027 0.0042 0.0028
(1.94) (1.07) (1.96) (1.91)
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Log of likelihood -1118.21 -2099.40 -2689.24 -4216.43
function
Note: Value in ( ) are t-statistics; value in [ ] are changes in duration as defined in
text. The control for location is central Canadian strikes; the control fir industry
is Other (defined in Appendix 1); the control for strike issue is miscellaneous.
Maximum likelihood estimation.1
For the OLS regression the dependent variable is the ln(strike duration). F -2
statistic = 7.4092; Mean of dependent variable = 2.2411; R = .275.2
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Sample Size
Statistic/Coefficient Small Medium Large
Constant 2.2188 2.2523 2.08641
Standard error 0.0507 0.0455 0.3584
t statistic 43.72 49.49 58.13
Estimated median 9.1967 9.5101 8.0371
Standard error 0.4667 0.4327 0.2877
t statistic 19.70 21.98 28.06
Estimated E(ln(duration)) 2.2188 2.2523 2.0888
Standard error 0.0507 0.0455 0.0354
t statistic 43.72 49.49 58.13
Sample mean of ln(duration) 2.2174 2.2411 2.1073
Sample mean of duration 30.1717 28.6332 23.0339
Sample median of duration 9.00 9.00 8.00
Conditional moment test 4.78 8.67 27.882
Notes: Based on a regression with explanatory variables expressed as deviations1
from trend. In this form the exp(constant) provides an estimate of the empirical
hazard rate for a strike where all of the variables are at their mean values. With
a log-logisitic specification and explanatory variables in deviations, the
constant is also an estimate of the expected value of log duration.
Test described in Jaggia (1991) and Kiefer (1988). This is a general2
specification test designed to capture effects of omitted variables and
heteroskedasticity. The version we use is based on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
moments of the generalized residuals and has 3 degrees of freedom.
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TABLE 7
Business Cycle Effects by Strike Issue
HAZARD
Strike Issue (N=551) (N=698) (N=1129)
Multiple issue -0.03449 -0.03669 -0.02814
(-1.39) (-1.59) (-2.10)
Union only 0.18554 0.00053 0.00730
(0.57) (0.02) (0.42)
Work only -0.04487 -0.05535 -0.03364
(-1.54) (-2.00) (-1.45)
Wage only -0.05785 -0.05524 -0.03906
(-2.92) (-2.96) (-3.93)
Note: For each strike issue, the first figure is the estimated coffecient calculated
from Table 5 and the second is the corresponding t-statistic.
